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Consumer Search Behavior in the Changing Credit Card Market 
 
I.  Introduction 
  Credit card balance switching has become an important issue in the 
banking community as cardholders seek to move their revolving credit to the lowest-cost 
lenders.  This kind of “search and switch” behavior would be expected to put downward 
pressure on credit card interest rates.  Previous research on the credit card market focused 
on why its interest rates persisted at levels greater than those for other types of consumer 
loans, and one explanation put forward was the inhibiting nature of high search costs in 
this market, especially for large-balance cardholders whose probability of credit rejection 
is high.  Recent developments in the credit card industry – in particular the Truth-in-
Lending Act of 1988
1 together with a large increase in direct solicitations – have changed 
the environment of this market substantially.  Because of this new environment, as well 
as improvements in data availability, the issue of credit card search needs to be revisited.   
The current paper identifies those consumers whose probability of rejection is 
high and tests whether this probability has any impact on their search propensities.  It 
does this by analyzing (i) the effect of large balances on the consumer’s probability of 
credit application rejection and (ii) how these factors – large balances and rejection 
probability –affect consumers’ search propensities.  In testing the search-cost hypothesis, 
the issue of endogeneity between consumers’ search and the likelihood of rejection is 
dealt with by estimating a simultaneous equations model. 
The results presented here show no evidence that search costs deter consumer 
interest rate search in the credit card market of the 1990s, either for high-balance 
                                                            
1 This is officially known as the Fair Credit and Charge Card Disclosure Act of 1988.   3 
cardholders with a greater probability of rejection or for low-balance cardholders.  In the 
next section we review the relevant literature on this market and discuss recent changes in 
the market environment.  Section III discusses our methodology and improvements in the 
recent data.  Section IV presents our results.  Finally, Section V concludes by 
summarizing our findings. 
 
II.  Background and Previous Literature on the Credit Card Market  
Consumer revolving credit, which includes credit card debt as its principal 
component, has been the fastest growing segment of the U.S. consumer loan market in 
recent years, rising from $2 billion in 1968 to about $626 billion in 2000
2.  Although the 
growth began in the 1970s, the major thrust came during the last two decades and 
coincided with the rise of credit card banks, the first of which were chartered in the early 
1980s
3.  More importantly, within consumer debt holdings, there was a shift towards 
revolving credit from 1968 to 2000: revolving credit relative to personal disposable 
income grew from 0.5 percent to 9.0 percent (an increase of 1,700 percent) while the ratio 
for overall consumer debt grew by only from 17 to 22 percent (an increase of 29 percent). 
A puzzling aspect of the credit card market in the 1980s was its comparatively 
high interest rates in spite of the fact that it was functionally de-regulated by 1982
4 and 
saw the entry of nearly 4,000 firms into the market during this decade.  The high average 
                                                            
2 Thomas A. Durkin, Credit Cards: Use and Consumer Attitudes, 1970-2000, Federal Reserve 
Bulletin, September, 2000. 
3 The vast majority of credit card banks began operation only in the mid-1980s.  Revolving credit 
outstanding rose from $70 billion in 1982 to $203 billion in 1989 and then doubled between 1991 
and 1997 — from $247 billion to $514 billion (Yoo, 1998) and Federal Reserve Board’s 2002 
Annual Report to U.S. Congress in pursuant of the Fair Credit and Charge Card Disclosure Act of 
1988. 
4 As a result of the Supreme Court Case Marquette National Bank v. First of Omaha Service 
Corporation, 439 U.S. 299 (1978), all state regulations on contract terms were gradually lifted.   4 
interest rate (around 18%) remained stable through 1991, showing no downward trend 
even as other market rates declined.   
Ausubel (1991) was the first to examine the phenomenon of high and downwardly 
sticky interest rates in the credit card industry, and he explained this on the basis 
consumers underestimating their borrowing potential.  He argued that a large portion of 
consumers in this market are not sensitive to interest rates because a priori they 
underestimate their borrowing potential.  On the other hand, those consumers who intend 
to accumulate more debt (i.e., the high-risk borrowers) are interest-sensitive.  Since banks 
do not want to attract the high-risk borrowers, this fear of adverse selection prevents them 
from competing on interest rates.  Ausubel felt that this behavior was compounded by the 
presence of high search and switch costs.  As a result, rates remained high and stable in 
this market.  Ausubel’s work has been critiqued on the grounds that it presents consumers 
as engaging in a type of irrational behavior.   
Subsequent papers have provided different explanations for the observed high 
levels of interest rates by focusing on various unique features of credit card debt, such as 
the non-collaterized characteristic (Mester, 1994) and open-ended revolving credit lines 
(Park, 1997).  Brito and Hartley (1995) provided an explanation based on the liquidity 
services offered by credit cards under consumption uncertainty and the transaction costs 
of alternative financing, which will make a rational consumer borrow on credit cards in 
spite of a higher interest rate.   
Calem and Mester (1995) empirically tested the search costs hypothesis of 
Ausubel and concluded that search and switch costs among cardholders can partly 
explain the high and downwardly sticky rates in the credit card market.  In independent   5 
regressions they examine the determinants of consumers’ credit card balances and credit 
rejection.  They find that (a) the level of balances is negatively related to search and (b) 
credit rejection is positively related to the level of balances.  Hence they conclude by 
inference that higher-balance cardholders, facing a greater risk of rejection, will have 
higher expected search costs and will search less.  This earlier work did not model 
consumer search explicitly but reached this conclusion by examining the determinates of 
credit card balances (one of which was consumer search). 
Since the crucial implication of the search hypothesis is that the higher likelihood 
of rejection deters the high balance consumers from searching for lower rates, here we 
directly estimate this hypothesis by fitting search behavior to credit card balances and 
past rejections.  In addition to using this direct specification, we also use a more recent 
round of the SCF, which contains improved variables for this type of investigation and 
allows the researcher to focus specifically on the credit card market. 
 
Relevant Changes in the Credit Card Market  
Beginning in 1991, credit card interest rates started to decline after remaining 
stable at around 18 percent for the previous twenty years.  They declined gradually until 
1994, and thereafter the average rate has fluctuated between roughly 14 and 16 percent
5.  
Although the current rates move in accord with the prime rate (reflecting the marginal 
cost of funds), the decline in the early 1990s cannot be attributed solely to the reduction 
in the cost of funds.  An examination of the prime rate shows that even though it was 
around 8 percent in both 1991 and 1998, the average credit card interest rate was 2.2 
percentage points lower in 1998 than it had been in 1991.   
                                                            
5 Federal Reserve Board’s 2001 Annual Report.   6 
A part of the fall in interest rates can be attributed to the number of competitors in 
this market, which had risen to around 6800 independently-issuing financial institutions 
by 2000.  Moreover, these banks have pursued a vigorous marketing strategy to attract 
customers.  This has led to an explosion in direct solicitations via mail, telemarketing, 
and the internet.  The number of direct solicitations reached 5 billion annually by the year 
2001, almost 4 solicitations per month per American household
6.  A further dimension of 
these solicitations has been the offer of low temporary rates on easily implemented 
balance transfers, encouraging customers to roll over balances from competing firms.  
This reduces switch costs substantially and makes balance switching a routine matter.  In 
addition, the Truth-in-Lending Act of 1988 required all issuers to disclose in their 
solicitations key offer information on interest rates, annual fees, grace periods, etc., 
thereby forcing them to report up-front their most important contract terms.  This also 
worked to make comparison shopping for credit card terms in the 1990s market easy and 
relatively costless. 
Finally, from a theoretical standpoint we should note that a contradiction arises in 
applying search cost theory to the 1990s credit card market, since cross-sectional interest 
rates have been widely dispersed during this period
7.  A dynamic sequential search model 
suggests that consumers’ intensity of search will be directly proportional to the dispersion 
in prices.  Consumers, aware of the distribution of interest rates in the market from direct 
solicitations, are therefore more likely to shop around for the best terms.  All these factors 
suggest that previous arguments regarding search need to be revisited in the context of 
the 1990s credit card market. 
                                                            
6 Federal Reserve Board’s 2001 Annual Report.  
7 In 1998-99, not including the balance transfer rates which started as low as 1.9%, post-
introductory interest rates have varied from approximately 9 % to as high as 25%.   7 
III.  The Empirical Investigation 
Data 
The 1998 SCF contains important information about consumers’ propensity to 
“comparison shop before making their credit decisions”.  Prior rounds of the SCF lumped 
search for credit together with search for savings/investments.  Thus the inability to 
distinguish the two types of search created unavoidable measurement error in earlier 
research on credit card search behavior.  In the 1998 SCF, search behavior for credit is 
separately identified from search behavior for savings/investments, and the responses do 
show significant differences in the numbers of consumers searching for credit as opposed 
to savings/investments.  Roughly half of those who do not comparison shop for credit 
registered a positive response to shopping for savings/investments (see Table 2, 
Appendix II).  The proxy for consumer search used in this paper, Shop, is constructed 
from the question that collects information on consumers’ propensity to search before 
making decisions related to credit and borrowing
8. 
Other important SCF information used here refers to credit rejection.  We will 
investigate two separate categories of rejection.  One is Turndown, which has been used 
in previous research (Calem and Mester) and encompasses rejection from all credit 
sources.  The second is CCturndown  (available only in later rounds of SCF), which 
identifies rejection from credit card issuers only.  Here we will report results obtained in 
separate fits of both of these rejection variables.
9 
 
                                                            
8 The responses to the shopping question range from “almost no shopping” through “moderate 
level of shopping” to “a great deal of shopping.”  Shop is assigned the value 0 for “almost no 
shopping” and 1 for all other categories. 
9 Both equal 1 if a credit application has been rejected and 0 otherwise.     8 
Methodology  
The approval of credit depends on lenders’ a priori estimate of the default 
thresholds of consumers based on various signals of credit risks. Therefore a lender’s 
rejection of a credit application is modeled using an index function of creditworthiness 
for consumer ‘i’, ) ( 1i i X C , that depends on a vector capturing an individual’s credit 
characteristics,  i X1 .  A credit application is rejected when  C X C i i < ) ( 1 , where C  is the 
threshold level for granting credit.  Writing  ) ( 1i i X C  as a first order approximation of the 
variables and normal error, we get the following probit model for Turndown 
i i i i X X C C T 1 1 1 1
* . ) ( ε δ + = − =             (1) 
where 0 * > i T results in rejection and  0 * ≤ i T  results in credit approval. 
On the other hand, a consumer searches for better credit terms if the utility 
derived from search through lower finance charges (after adjusting for search costs) 
outweighs his utility from not searching.  The search behavior of consumer ‘i’ is 
therefore modeled using the latent variable  ) 0 ( ) , ( , 2 2
*
i nsi i i si i X V X V S − = φ , where 
si V and  nsi V  denote the utility derived from searching and not searching respectively.  
The utility from search depends on a vector of individual specific characteristics  i X2  and 
also on  i φ , which represents both pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs of search and in 
itself depends on  i X2 .  Writing the utilities as a linear approximation of the individual 
specific characteristics and a normal error, the determinants of consumer search can then 
be analyzed with the following probit equation 
i i i nsi i i si i X X V X V S 2 2 2 , 2 2
* . ) 0 ( ) , ( ε δ φ + = − =            (2)   9 
where individual ‘i’ engages in search if  0 * > i S and does not search when  0 * ≤ i S .  
Since outstanding card balances and a consumer’s past rejections,  i T , are included 
in  i X2 , equation (2) provides a direct test for the hypothesis that consumers with large 
balances, who are more subject to rejection, will be inhibited from shopping around for 
credit terms due to their higher expected cost of search. 
 
Endogeneity  
It can be argued that since the underlying hypothesis is that a higher probability of 
rejection makes high balance consumers reluctant to comparison shop, then equation (2) 
should include the latent variable  *
i T  rather than the indicator variable for rejection 
i Turndown .  Also it might be argued that consumers with a higher search propensity 
subject themselves to more rejection.  To account for this latter possibility, we explore 
the endogeneity between Shop and CCturndown.  Re-writing  ) , ( 1
*
1 i i i Z S X =  and 
) , ( 2
*
2 i i i Z T X = , the paper estimates the following two probit equations simultaneously 
using a two step maximum likelihood procedure (Mallar, 1977).  
i i i i

















     (3) 
The two-step procedure gives consistent estimates of the parameters of the model 
but does not provide the correct estimated second step standard errors.  We follow 
Murphy and Topel (1985) to calculate the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of the 
second stage coefficients.  This accounts for the interdependence of the error terms and   10 
the fact that the unobservable regressors have been estimated in calculating the second 
step coefficients (see Appendix I for details).  If  2 α turns out to be insignificant, then we 
can unambiguously conclude that probability of rejection does not enter in consumers 
decision to search for better credit terms in this market.   
 
IV. Results 
  Table 1 below presents the results of the independent probits in equation 1 and 3. 
There are two sets of results.  One is the fit of the credit card rejection variable 
CCturndown  (column 1)  to outstanding balances and the search variable Shop.  The 
second set of results presents the fit of Shop (column 2) to CCturndown and outstanding 
balances.  CCturndown and Shop are both binary variables taking the value 1 for having 
incurred credit application rejection and engaging in search behavior respectively.  We 
also include control variables for income, bankruptcy and delinquency histories, average 
monthly payments on consumer loans and monthly rents, liquid assets, homeownership, 
and age.
10  As noted earlier, we have included the fits for both turndown variables – 
CCturndown (i.e., specific to credit cards) and Turndown (i.e., general credit turndown) – 
for the sake of comparison with earlier research.  We see from the table that for both 
turndown variables, the level of outstanding balances has a positive and highly significant 
effect, consistent with earlier research.  Note, however, that the variable representing 
consumer search – Shop – is not significant in either of these fits.  
Turning to the determinants of consumer search variable Shop, we find that (a) 
outstanding credit card Balances have a significant positive effect on consumers’ search 
                                                            
10 A detailed description of variables is presented in Appendix II.     11 
behavior; and (b) being rejected for credit does not effect search significantly.  These 
findings contradict the hypothesis that high costs impede consumer search in this market.  
Thus finance charge considerations appear to offset any search and switch costs that 
might exist for high balance consumers.  Even though high balance consumers are more 
likely to be denied credit, this does not deter them from searching for lower interest rates.  
These results also hold when Shop is used in an ordered probit model as the 5-category 
variable from its original SCF format (i.e., ranging from 0 (almost no shopping) to 4 
(high level of shopping) (see Appendix III for these results).  In addition, the results hold 
when the SCF questions referring to all credit card balances (store as well as bank) are 
used instead of balances on bank cards only.   12 
Table 1: Independent Probit Estimates for CCturndown/Turndown, and Shop 
 
  Credit Card Turndown Only All Consumer Loan Turndown 
Variable (SE)  CCturndown   Shop   Turndown   Shop   
               
Constant  -0.4219 **  1.8693 **  -0.1536   1.8482 ** 
  (0.1680)   (0.1156)   (0.1481)   (0.1169)  
Shop  -0.0143               -   0.0561               -   
  (0.1052)      (0.0913)     
CCturndown                  -    -0.0401                -                -   
     (0.1137)          
Turndown                  -                     -    0.0392  
            (0.0897)   
Balance  1.9596 **  1.3044 **  2.2294 **  1.2556 ** 
  (0.4247)   (0.5939)   (0.4071)   (0.5924)  
Mn.Payments                      -    3.6791 **             -    3.6678 ** 
     (1.4924)        (1.4928)   
Bankruptcy  0.4122 **           -    0.8956 **           -   
  (0.1228)      (0.1038)     
Delinquency  0.2360 **  -0.0075   0.5198 **  -0.0161  
  (0.0645)   (0.0681)   (0.0573)   (0.0693)  
Income  -0.0001   -0.0071 **  -0.0104 *  -0.0070 ** 
  (0.0064)   (0.0028)   (0.0061)   (0.0028)  
Liquid Assets  -0.0174   -0.0032 **  -0.0038   -0.0032 ** 
  (0.0115)   (0.0011)   (0.0041)   (0.0011)  
Mn.Payments/Income  0.0747   -0.0204   0.2190 **  -0.0221  
  (0.0577)   (0.0319)   (0.0777)   (0.0319)  
Home Ownership  -0.2605 **  0.1626 **  -0.1412 *  0.1671 ** 
  (0.0845)   (0.0745)   (0.0745)   (0.0744)  
Age  -0.0205 **  -0.0201 **  -0.0238 **  -0.0199 ** 
  (0.0029)   (0.0019)   (0.0025)   (0.0019)  
             
Chi-Sq  201.51   181.42   488.97   181.49  
N=3193.  
**  Significant at 5% level of confidence  
*   Significant at 10% level of confidence    13 
Two-Stage Estimates  
Though the results from the independent probits suggest that CCturndown does 
not affect Shop, we now explore the link further by estimating the equations accounting 
for endogeneity.  For identification purposes, bankruptcy is used as an instrument for 
CCturndown.  Clearly consumers with past record of bankruptcies are more likely to get 
rejected by credit issuers, but there is no theory or solid evidence suggesting that past 
bankruptcy filings affect shopping behavior of individuals.  Likewise, the consumer’s 
average monthly payments (rent, mortgage, auto, lease) is included in the Shop equation 
and not in CCturndown.  Consumers having to make high average monthly payments will 
be sensitive to the price portion of any credit contract and will be more likely to search 
for lower interest rates.  Average monthly payments should therefore have a direct impact 
on the shopping propensity of consumers and is used an instrument for Shop.  Some 
researchers might argue that credit issuers may use average monthly payments as an 
indicator of default probabilities of consumers.  However, the average monthly payment 
in itself does not convey any signal of credit risk, but does so only relative to monthly 
income.  The ratio of average monthly payments to monthly household income is 
therefore included in both the equations.  
The maximum likelihood estimates of the simultaneous two-equation probit 
model are reported in Table 2.  Following the convention used in Table 1, for the sake of 
comparison we have included the fits for both turndown variables.  The first stage 
reduced-form estimates in Appendix IV give an indication of the strength of the 
instruments.  Previous bankruptcies significantly affect CCturndown (column I) at the 
one percent level but do not significantly affect Shop. Conversely higher average monthly    14 
Table 2: Structural ML Estimates of Shop & CCturndown/Turndown 
 
  Credit Card Turndown Only All Consumer Loan Turndown 
Variable (SE)  CCturndown   Shop    Turndown   Shop   
              
Constant  -1.6533 *  1.9815 **  -0.7990   1.8668 ** 
  (0.8733)   (0.1811)   (0.9724)   (0.1164)  
Shop (latent)  0.6493               -    0.3761               -   
  (0.4588)      (0.5148)     
Ccturndown (latent)             -    0.2845               -               -   
      (0.3189)         
Turndown (latent)             -               -               -    0.1305   
            (0.1413)  
Balance  1.0956   0.7307   1.7438 **  0.9883  
  (0.8065)   (0.8573)   (0.8216)   (0.6678)  
Mn.Payments             -    2.9903 *             -    3.4880 ** 
     (1.5428)      (1.6782)  
Bankruptcy  0.3356 **            -    0.8537 **             -   
  (0.1580)      (0.1298)     
Delinquency  0.2509 **  -0.0859   0.5280 **  -0.0858  
  (0.0826)   (0.1106)   (0.0630)   (0.1059)  
Income  0.0026   -0.0065   -0.0089   -0.0055 * 
  (0.0072)   (0.0051)   (0.0068)   (0.0036)  
Liquid Assets  -0.0156   0.0019   -0.0027   -0.0026 ** 
  (0.0117)   (0.0107)   (0.0043)   (0.0018)  
Mn.Payments/Income  0.0702 *  -0.0372   0.2050 **  -0.0468  
  (0.0384)   (0.0334)   (0.0848)   (0.0453)  
Home Ownership  -0.3858 **  0.2454 **  -0.2120 **  0.1858 ** 
  (0.1324)   (0.1198)   (0.1275)   (0.0783)  
Age  -0.0073   -0.0143 **  -0.0164   -0.0169 ** 
  (0.0098)   (0.0068)   (0.0108)   (0.0039)  
                
Chi-Sq  203.09   182.17   489.14   182.17  
N=3193. 
**  Significant at 5% level of confidence  
*  Significant at 10% level of confidence 
 
 
   15 
payments increase consumer search (column II) but do not significantly affect 
CCturndown.  Turning to the second-stage structural estimates in Table 2, we find that 
these are similar to the earlier independent probit results.  Here also CCturndown does 
not have a significant impact on Shop and vice-versa.  These results demonstrate that past 
rejections do not enter in consumers’ decisions to search for lower rates. The results are 
similar when Turndown is used instead of CCturndown.  
 
V.  Summary and Conclusions 
Credit card debt has been the fastest growing segment of the U.S. consumer loan 
market in the last two decades.  One line of research in this area has focused on 
cardholder search behavior as a factor behind the phenomenon of high and downwardly 
sticky credit card interest rates.  In recent years, however, the environment in this market 
has changed significantly, and many aspects of consumer behavior uncovered in earlier 
research are no longer in evidence.  Here we examine the earlier hypothesis that search 
and switch costs, especially on the part of high-balance cardholders who are more subject 
to credit rejection, inhibit search in this market.  The explosion of direct solicitations 
featuring full disclosure of rate and other contract terms as required by the Truth-in-
Lending Act of 1988, has cast doubt on the salience of these search and switch costs 
arguments.  We have examined the search phenomenon using the more recent 1998 
Survey of Consumer Finance and a direct model specification for consumer search, 
investigating the possible endogeneity of consumer search and probability of rejection.   
Our results show that: (a) high rejection probabilities do not affect search 
propensities; and (b) high balance consumers search more even though they have a higher   16 
likelihood of rejection.  These results imply that search costs are no longer a dominant 
economic factor in this market.  They also imply that the balance-carrying consumers of 
the 1990s have become more rational and display greater sensitivity to the interest rate 
terms of a credit card contract.  Our findings demonstrate one important policy impact of 
the Truth-in-Lending Act which has lowered the cost to consumers of gathering 
information about credit terms.  This change in search behavior is an important factor in 
the observed decline in credit card interest rates in recent years.   17 
Appendix I 
Corrected Asymptotic Variance-Covariance Matrix for Two-Step MLE 
The reduced form equations of the model in (3) are as follows: 
i i i e Z T 1 1
* . + Π =                (3a) 
i i i e Z S 2 2
* . + Π =                (3b) 
where ) , ( 2 1 i i i Z Z Z = .  First, consistent estimates of the reduced form parameters are 
obtained by maximizing the marginal likelihood functions constructed from (3a) and (3b) 
separately.  Let L1 be the likelihood function for the first stage reduced form equation for 
Turndowni , 
[] ∑ = Π − − + Π =
n
i i i i i Z F T Z F T L
1 1 1 1 )} . ( 1 log{ ). 1 ( )} . ( log{ .   . 
Maximizing L1 gives  ) . ˆ ( ˆ
1
*
i i Z T Π . Second, this estimated probability is substituted for its 
unobserved counterpart in the structural equation, and the likelihood function for the 
structural equation is then maximized with respect to its parameters.  If L2 is the 
likelihood function for the second stage structural equation for Shop, then substituting 
) . ˆ ( ˆ
1
*
i i Z T Π  for Turndowni in L2 gives 
[] ∑ =
+ Π − − + + Π =
n
i




2 2 2 1
*
2 2 )} . ) . ( ˆ . ( 1 log{ ). 1 ( )} . ) . ( ˆ . ( log{ . β α β α  . 
Maximizing L2 gives consistent estimates  ) ˆ , ˆ ( 2 2 β α . 
Writing ) , ( 2 2 2 β α θ = , the correct asymptotic variance-covariance matrix for the 
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These matrices are replaced by their estimated counterparts in the calculation of the 
standard errors.  The above procedure is followed for the structural equation Turndown 
also.    19 
Appendix II 
 
Definitions of Variables 
VARIABLE  DEFINITION 
Shop  1 – Consumer shops around before making credit decisions 
0 -  Otherwise 
CCturndown  1 – Turned down specifically for a credit card or denied increase in credit line.   
0 – Otherwise 
Turndown 
1 – Turned down or denied any form of consumer credit; includes credit cards, 
      mortgages, home equity lines, etc. 
0 – Otherwise 
Balance  Outstanding Balances on Bank Cards (MC, Visa, Discover, AMEX) 
Mn.Payments  Average Monthly Payments; includes mortgage payments, rent, auto, lease. 
Bankruptcy  1 – Declared bankruptcy in the past 
0 – Not declared bankruptcy 
Delinquency 
0 –  No loans or have loans but never missed  a payment 
1 – Sometimes missed payments but never by more than 2  months 
2 – Behind on their payments by 2 months or more 
Income  Annual Household Income. 
Liquid Assets  Liquid assets held; checking, savings, money market deposit accounts, CDs, 
mutual funds. 
Mn.Payments/In
come  Avg. Monthly Payments / Monthly Income; 
Home 
Ownership 
1 – Owns home 
0 –  Rents 
Age  Age of Respondent 
 
 
Cross-Tabulations for Shop for Credit/Borrowing and Shop for Savings/Investments  
 
                          Savings/Investments 
Credit/Borrowing  Do Not Shop for S&I (=0) Do Shop for S&I (=1) 
Do Not Shop for Credit (= 0)  49.64% 50.36% 
Do Shop for Credit (= 1)  12.75% 87.25% 
The first row reflects the relative frequency of “not shopping” for credit across the same 
categories for savings and investments.  The second row reflects the relative frequency of 
“shopping” for credit across the same categories.    20 
Appendix III 
 
Independent Probit Estimates for Ccturndown/Turndown and Ordered Probit 
Estimates for Shop 
  Credit Card Turndown Only All Consumer Loan Turndown 
Variable (SE)  Ccturndown   Shop  Turndown   Shop  
             
Constant  -0.3865 **  1.5030 **  -0.0647   1.5015 ** 
  (0.1491)   (0.0830)   (0.1328)   (0.0842)  
Shop  -0.0191      -0.0121     
  (0.0284)      (0.0243)     
CCturndown     -0.0684         
     (0.0783)        
Turndown            -0.0379  
            (0.0623)  
Balance  1.9694 **  0.6169 *  2.2455 **  0.6114 * 
  (0.4251)   (0.3301)   (0.4068)   (0.3312)  
Mn.Payments     0.6394      0.6417  
     (1.1202)      (1.1241)  
Bankruptcy  0.4145 **     0.8989 **    
  (0.1228)      (0.1038)     
Delinquency  0.2343 **  -0.0983 **  0.5185 **  -0.0950 ** 
  (0.0645)   (0.0479)   (0.0573)   (0.0485)  
Income  -0.0002   -0.0050 **  -0.0107 *  -0.0050 ** 
  (0.0064)   (0.0021)   (0.0062)   (0.0021)  
Liquid Assets  -0.0174   -0.0021 **  -0.0038   -0.0021 ** 
  (0.0115)   (0.0005)   (0.0040)   (0.0005)  
Mn.Payments/Income  0.0738   -0.0153   0.2177 **  -0.0157  
  (0.0569)   (0.0401)   (0.0784)   (0.0411)  
Home Ownership  -0.2583 **  0.0900 *  -0.1371 *  0.0919 * 
  (0.0844)   (0.0520)   (0.0745)   (0.0521)  
Age  -0.0206 **  -0.0115 **  -0.0241 **  -0.0115 ** 
  (0.0029)   (0.0014)   (0.0025)   (0.0014)  
Threshold parameters             
MU(1)     0.2668 **      0.2668 ** 
MU(2)     1.3504 **      1.3503 ** 
MU(3)     1.7678 **      1.7677 ** 
            
Chi-Square  201.94  103.23  488.84   102.81  
N=3193. Shop ranges from 0 (Almost no Shopping) to 4 (High Level of Shopping). **  
Significant at 5% level of confidence *  Significant at 10% level of confidence    21 
Appendix IV 
 
Two-Step ML Estimates of Shop and Ccturndown/Turndown 
1
st-Step Reduced Form Estimates 
    Credit Card Turndown Only All Consumer Loan Turndown 
Variable (SE)  CCturndown   Shop    Turndown   Shop   
             
Constant  -0.4498 **  1.8535 **  -0.1019   1.8535 ** 
  (0.1289)   (0.1134)   (0.1168)   (0.1134)  
Balance  1.9257 **  1.2786 **  2.2247 **  1.2786 ** 
  (0.4251)   (0.5898)   (0.4077)   (0.5898)  
Mn.Payments  2.3815   3.6680 ** 1.3795    3.6680 * 
  (1.8064)   (1.4919)   (1.8234)   (1.4919)  
Bankruptcy  0.4117 ** 0.1171    0.8978 ** 0.1171   
  (0.1229)   (0.1269)   (0.1038)   (0.1269)  
Delinquency  0.2394 **  -0.0177   0.5214 **  -0.0177  
  (0.0646)   (0.0683)   (0.0573)   (0.0683)  
Income  -0.0020   -0.0070 **  -0.0115 *  -0.0070 ** 
  (0.0069)   (0.0028)   (0.0064)   (0.0028)  
Liquid Assets  -0.0177   -0.0032 **  -0.0039   -0.0032 ** 
  (0.0116)   (0.0011)   (0.0041)   (0.0011)  
Mn.Payments/Income  0.0564   -0.0211   0.1971 **  -0.0211  
  (0.0435)   (0.0318)   (0.0860)   (0.0318)  
Home Ownership  -0.2778 **  0.1664 **  -0.1494 **  0.1664 ** 
  (0.0851)   (0.0743)   (0.0758)   (0.0743)  
Age  -0.0203 **  -0.0200 **  -0.0239 **  -0.0200 ** 
  (0.0029)   (0.0019)   (0.0025)   (0.0019)  
                
Chi-Sq  203.09   182.17   489.14   182.17  
N=3193. 
**  Significant at 5% level of confidence  
*  Significant at 10% level of confidence  
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